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Collaborative purchasingIt is increasingly recognized that progress can be made in the development of integrated theory for under-
standing, explaining and better predicting key aspects of buyer–seller relationships and industrial networks
by drawing upon non-traditional research perspectives and domains. One such non-traditional research per-
spective is stochastic modeling which has shown that large scale regularities emerge from the individual in-
teractions between idiosyncratic actors. When these macroscopic patterns repeat across a wide range of
ﬁrms, industries and business types this commonality suggests directions for further research which we pursue
through a differentiated replication of the Dirichlet stochastic model. We demonstrate predictable behavioral
patterns of purchase and loyalty in two distinct industrial markets for components used in critical surgical pro-
cedures. This differentiated replication supports the argument for the use of stochastic modeling techniques in
industrial marketingmanagement, not only as amanagement tool but also as a lens to inform and focus research
towards integrated theories of the evolution of market structure and network relationships.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
When asked why he robbed banks, Willie Sutton, a notorious bank
robber, is reputed to have replied by saying “that's where the money
is”. The saying still resonates as an injunction to heed the most likely
explanation. Indeed, physicians are taught “Sutton's Law” as a warn-
ing to seek the most likely diagnosis ﬁrst1 (Chang, 2009).
What lessons does “Sutton's Law” have for developing and integrat-
ing theory in industrial marketing management research? The search
for a valuable contribution should start in the areas where that contri-
bution is most likely to be found — to look for the banks. General theo-
ries seek to integrate middle level theories in order to explain a wide
range of behavioral phenomena, independent of context (Hunt, 1983).
This paper argues that well-established empirical regularities provide
a starting point for integrating theory and form a solid foundation for
higher level explanation — that is, they show us where the banks are.
The observation of empirical patterns is an opportunity for guiding fur-
ther research in order to uncover causal mechanisms and to “delve into
the underlying processes so as to understand the systematic reasons forhool of Business and Economics,
Tel.: +44 1509 223297.
ing us select the correct epony-
e, with Sutton's Law invoking
e is no requirement for themost
-NC-ND license.a particular occurrence or non-occurrence” (Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 378).
When those same patterns are repeated in different contexts, industries,
ﬁrms and relationships, then we have the basis for integrating the causal
mechanisms over these different situations.
While it is entirely possible that similar empirical patterns may
arise from completely different causal mechanisms in different con-
texts, we argue that the most likely solution starts from the assump-
tion that similar phenomena have similar generative mechanisms and
that integrated general theory is most likely to emerge from a research
program guided by a common understanding of the ‘explananda’ and
the nature of the theories that provide the explanations.
The early Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) research is
an excellent example of “Sutton's Law” in action. The original IMP re-
searchers ﬁrst located their bank — the emerging body of empirical
evidence indicating the existence of stable long term relationships
between individually signiﬁcant buyers and sellers (Håkansson &
Wootz, 1979). The empirical evidence arising from a study of al-
most 900 buyer–seller relationships across ﬁve European countries
(Cunningham, 1980) provided the starting point for the research
which resulted in the interaction approach (Håkansson, 1982) which
in turn became the “most likely solution” at the heart of the IMP re-
search program. As more researchers adopted the IMP approach, the
theory became broader and deeper but at its heart it retains the princi-
ples of the interaction approach and the associated assumptions about
the nature of buyers and suppliers and their network relationships
(Ford & Håkansson, 2006).
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emerged to describe, model and explain regular patterns of buyer be-
havior. Such patterns have been observed across a wide range of con-
sumer markets, from packaged goods to durables (Uncles, Ehrenberg,
& Hammond, 1995). Applied to organizational markets, established
consumer modeling techniques can provide insights into the dynamic
nature of the portfolio of relationships between buyers and suppliers.
Analysis of the exchange behavior in multiple buyer–seller relation-
ship dyads detects patterns of structural change and provides a mar-
ket “norm” againstwhich to benchmark individual relationships (Gadde
& Mattsson, 1987). However, previous studies have focused on multiple
category suppliers to a single focal ﬁrm (Dubois, Gadde, & Mattsson,
2003; Kamp, 2005). In contrast, the analysis in this paper presents a
study of multiple buyers and suppliers operating in a single category,
demonstrating the power of analysis of the macroscopic patterns of be-
havior to identify and interpret structural changes and the impact of
these changes on individual buyer–supplier relationships.
This paper argues that in addition to describing emergent aggre-
gate behaviors in an organizational purchasing context, the use of
such models can direct further research and development of theory
to explain behavioral phenomena that repeat across ﬁrms, industries
and business types. We present two empirical examples that use a
stochastic model to analyze behavior in public healthcare procure-
ment. Our approach is to compare the patterns predicted by the cho-
sen stochastic model with actual purchasing behavior. Different forms
of market structure are characterized by different observed purchas-
ing patterns, informing and guiding further research to help to uncov-
er the structures and generative mechanisms that help explain the
observed phenomena. The deviations between the model predictions
and the observed behaviors can also be interpreted in terms of the as-
sumptions underlying the stochasticmodel; this in turn provides insights
into the nature of interactions in industrial markets. Our approach helps
to address the problem of limited progress in attaining theoretical unity
in the understanding of buyer–seller relationships and industrial net-
works through the use of a stochasticmodel as an integratingmechanism
for theory development.
The paper is structured as follows. Following this Introduction, we
provide an explanation of how purposeful empiricism helps integrate
theory and hence “contributes to general theory development in indus-
trial marketing research” (Peters, Pressey, Vanharanta, & Johnston,
2013).
In Section 2.1 we present a brief overview of the NDB-Dirichlet
stochastic model (subsequently referred to as the Dirichlet) before ex-
amining in Section 2.2 how its core assumptions can be interpreted
within a context of extended networks of long term interorganizational
relationships in business-to-business markets (subsequently referred
to as themarkets-as-networks approach).Within this sectionwe indicate
how the Dirichlet provides a theoretical lens through which to view any
market, focusing attention on large scale regularities that repeat across
different contexts and so contributing to the goal of “attaining theoretical
unity” in our understanding of buyer–seller relationships (Peters et al.,
2013).
Two empirical examples are presented in Section 3 illustrating how
the large scale patterns predicted by the Dirichlet provide a mechanism
to describe market structures that can be discussed in terms of relation-
ship interdependence and connectedness. The empirical data are taken
from a three year longitudinal study of purchasing surgical consumables
in a public sector collaborative procurement organization. The study
identiﬁes two management interventions designed to inﬂuence pur-
chasing behaviors, one initiated by a supplier and the other by the pur-
chasing organization. The analysis of the purchasing patterns before,
during and after these interventions provides valuable insights intomar-
ket making and the extent to which purchasing patterns can be changed
within the constraints of an established network of relationships.
Section 4 discusses how the observation of regular patterns of pur-
chasing behavior, and just as importantly, deviations from these regularpatterns can direct further exploratory and explanatory research to un-
cover the underlying portfolio of relationships, structures and genera-
tive mechanisms that give rise to the regular patterns, representing
the purposeful empiricism in the paper's title. In contrast to blind empir-
icism and the development of theory in isolation, this purposeful empir-
icism directs the development of theory towards explaining empirical
regularities that are replicated across different ﬁrm, business and indus-
try contexts, with an increased likelihood of developing more uniﬁed
theoretical understanding.
The paper proposes using the large scale regularities described by
the Dirichlet as a guiding structure to direct and integrate further re-
search. If phenomena repeat across different business contexts, the
most likely explanation is that the phenomena have similar underly-
ing mechanisms, thereby providing a basis for more general theory.
The paper makes three contributions to the industrial marketing re-
search literature. First, we present a highly differentiated replication
of the Dirichlet in an organizational market where the patterns of
buyer–supplier interaction are dynamic. Our second contribution is
to show how the theoretical benchmarks predicted by the Dirichlet
can deliver insights into changing market structures and thereby iden-
tify changes in the network of relationships. Our third contribution uses
the empirical examples to demonstrate how the Dirichlet model pro-
vides a theoretical lens to focus analysis on speciﬁc situations. In partic-
ular, deviations from the Dirichlet benchmarks point to violations of the
Dirichlet assumptions which in turn can direct analysis towards the un-
derlying reasons for why the assumptions may not hold in speciﬁc
circumstances.
2. With purpose — towards integrated theory
Theory provides explanation, demonstrates interconnectedness
and posits causal mechanisms for observed behaviors and structures
(Stewart & Zinkhan, 2006; Sutton & Staw, 1995). By extension, inte-
grated or general theory explains a wider range of observed behav-
iors and structures, in particular by unifying data and empirical ﬁndings
across different situations (for example, industry sector or business type)
(Stewart & Zinkhan, 2006). Replicating empirical research in different
contexts establishes boundary conditions for the ﬁndings and thus the
range of conditions over which the theory is expected to hold, where
the role of replication in the development of knowledge is succinctly de-
scribed by Hubbard and Lindsay (in press).
However, the idiosyncratic nature of business organizations and
their network relationships can make it difﬁcult to select cases with
common characteristics. To overcome this limitation we propose that
the large scale patterns that emerge from the self-organizing behaviors
of individual actors are used as the basis for selection of relevant
research studies. If these patterns emerge in different situations, then it
is this commonality that suggests the relevance of the patterns for
directing further research (Downward, Finch, & Ramsay, 2002). Epstein
(2008) calls these large scale regularities “macroscopic explananda” and
describes how models that represent such patterns can capture
“qualitative behaviors of overarching interest”, thus informing the
conceptual foundations of their respective ﬁelds.
The approach used in this paper uses a stochastic model of the ob-
served regularities as a theoretical lens to focus the analysis on individual
actors and their relationships. As the regularities can be characterized by
awell understood theoretical model, the exceptions to the expected pat-
terns can be interpreted in terms of the explicit assumptions of that
model (Epstein, 2008).
With its emphasis on the utilization of actual purchase behaviors,
stochastic modeling has an inherently empiricist epistemology unlike
the predominantly realist and interpretivist epistemologies that inform
much industrial marketing research (Easton, 1995). It should be noted
that stochastic models provide mathematical representations of ob-
served phenomena rather than seeking causal relationships. As amech-
anism for describing the “what” – the observed event, the stochastic
Table 1
Overview of Dirichlet studies in organizational markets.
Collaborative
procurement
Public
procurement
Timescale Market
dynamics
Aviation fuel (Uncles &
Ehrenberg, 1990)
No Partiala 1 year Stationary
Prescriptions (Stern, 1994) No Yes 1 year Stationary
Foreign exchange (Bowman
& Lele-Pingle, 1997)
No No 1 year Stationary
Concrete (Pickford &
Goodhardt, 2000)
No No 3 months Stationary
Surgical supplies [this
paper] (2012)
Yes Yes 3 years Dynamic
a Includes state owned airline customers.
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underlying generative forces behind the observed event, may exist in-
dependently of the observation (Mingers, 2003).
Stochastic models that characterize regularities in buyer behavior
are well established in consumer marketing research, although they
are less widely adopted in industrial marketing. This may be due in
part to difﬁculties in data collection as industrial marketers rarely have
thewealth of panel or scanner data available to researchers of consumer
buying behavior (Easton, 1980; Pickford&Goodhardt, 2000). The follow-
ing section provides an introduction to the Dirichlet which is one of the
best known and most well-established models in the marketing litera-
ture (Uncles et al., 1995).
2.1. The Dirichlet
The Dirichlet is a theoretical statistical model of purchase inci-
dence and customer choice (Dacko, 2008), which was originally de-
rived from empirical observation of consumer buying behavior and
has beenwidely replicated. Its ubiquity has resulted in it being recognized
as an empirically based theory rather than a mere model (Ehrenberg,
1995).
The ﬁve key theoretical assumptions underlying the Dirichlet are
as follows (Goodhardt, Ehrenberg, & Chatﬁeld, 1984):
i. Purchase activity for each buyer over time follows a Poisson
distribution with a constant long run average purchasing rate.
ii. These average purchasing rates vary across the population of
buyers according to a Gamma distribution.
iii. Over a series of purchases the supplier choices made by each
buyer follow a zero order multinomial distribution with a
steady probability that they will choose a particular supplier
on any particular purchase occasion.
iv. These probabilities are distributed across the population of
buyers according to a multivariate Beta distribution called the
Dirichlet.
v. The supplier choice probabilities are distributed over the pop-
ulation independently of the average purchase frequency of
each buyer.
The detailed distributional assumptions underpinning the model
can be found in Goodhardt et al. (1984). These assumptions hold for
conditions of stationary markets (i.e. approximately steady total vol-
umes and supplier market shares) without market partitioning (i.e. no
market segmentation) (Goodhardt et al., 1984; Sharp & Driesener,
2000). The Dirichlet successfully provides theoretical measures of mar-
ket performance which closely match those observed in practice in a
multiplicity of different consumer markets throughout the world. The
interpretation of the assumptions in an industrial/organizational mar-
keting context will be discussed in the following section. In Table 1 we
provide a summary of the very limited range of published Dirichlet ap-
plications in industrial/organizational markets. We also highlight the
differences between these previous studies and the empirical analyses
reported in this paper. Uncles and Ehrenberg (1990) analyzed a selec-
tion of aviation fuel contracts awarded by airlines across different loca-
tions (airports). The analysis considered the contracts between airlines
and their fuel suppliers at a particular point in time and did not take into
account any renegotiation of these contracts. Airlines were observed to
spread their purchases across several suppliers in close accord with the
Dirichlet theoretical predictions; therewere few100% loyal buyers (and
no segmentation). Similar patterns were seen in studies covering the
prescribing behavior of physicians (Stern, 1994) and the foreign ex-
changemarketwhere Bowman and Lele-Pingle (1997) analyzed survey
data from corporations purchasing ﬁnancial services; here again the
Dirichlet provided excellent predictions of the claimed behaviors. A
study of the ready mixed concrete market by Pickford and Goodhardt
(2000) used a survey to collect recall-based purchase histories (previousthree months) and Juster scale-based purchase likelihoods (next three
months). These were then used to operationalize the Dirichlet model,
and the analysis also showed regular patterns of split loyalty.
The studies listed in Table 1 show that the Dirichlet results can be
replicated to a selection of different organizational market contexts.
The analyses in the current paper build on the previous studies by
presenting a highly differentiated replication in a collaborative public
procurement environmentwhere there are substantial dynamic changes
in the patterns of buyer–seller interactions over an extended period.
2.2. The Dirichlet and markets-as-networks
It may seem that the concepts of long term buyer–supplier rela-
tionships embedded in the industrial marketing research tradition
are inconsistent with the “as if random” purchasing behavior assumed
by stochastic modeling approaches such as the Dirichlet. McCabe and
Stern (2009) have shown how stochastic modeling and industrial net-
works offer complementary views of organizational purchasing behav-
ior. In a systematic analysis of the ontological, epistemological and
methodological similarities between stochasticmodeling and industrial
networks they demonstrate that despite the very different approaches
both research traditions share important assumptions concerning the
heterogeneity of individual network actors, the many and variable in-
ﬂuences on buyer behavior, and the constraints on independent mana-
gerial action in a context of network interdependence or apparent “as if
random” behavior.
This paper shows how the macro-level Dirichlet patterns can in-
form and complement further research at the level of the individual
relationship and hence it is instructive to consider how three key con-
cepts which underpin the Dirichlet can be interpreted in the context
of long term relationships in an extended network of organizational
interactions. These three concepts are:
• the market
• stationarity (stability) and
• non-partitioning.
2.2.1. Concepts of the market
The “market” in Dirichlet analysis is deﬁned by the population of
sellers of a product and the population of potential buyers for a speciﬁc
product category. The relevant population of sellers is determined simply
by substitution through the choices made by the buyers. The relevant
population of buyers is deﬁned by the scope of the analysis and may be
bounded by the analyst on a regional basis (e.g. the concrete analysis
by Pickford & Goodhardt, 2000), or by an industry structure determined
by the activities of the buying organization (e.g. airlines Uncles &
Ehrenberg, 1990), prescribing physicians (Stern, 1994). The measures
used to parameterize the Dirichlet model are the market share and the
penetration, both of which require a “closed” deﬁnition of the market.
In contrast, the “market” as conceptualized in the markets-as-networks
approach is “open”with dynamic boundaries determined by how actors
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network interdependencies may be substitutive and complementary
(Mattsson & Johanson, 2006) and can extend beyond the narrow
deﬁnition of industry structure based on the substitutive products
and services of the market participants to include other actors such
as regulators or policy makers (Welch & Wilkinson, 2005).
This is not to say that theDirichlet ignores the extent towhich dyadic
exchange relationships are embedded in the extended network or
that the aggregation of exchange somehow implies homogeneity in
the population of actors, all behaving in the same way. Instead, the
observed behaviors are the result of the inﬂuence of all the individ-
ual interdependencies affecting the choices of a population of heteroge-
neous market participants. As seen in Fig. 1, the Dirichlet provides a
view of the emergent behaviors arising from interactions in a bounded
“network of overlapping networks” centered around buyer–seller
dyads 1, 2, … (n−1), n.
These networks may be overlapping with sellers serving more
than one buyer, sellers sharing suppliers, buyers maintaining relation-
shipswithmultiple sellers, and cross-industry inﬂuences such as collec-
tive purchasing organizations or regulatory bodies.
Although the Dirichlet is parameterized with a closed market def-
inition, the patterns that emerge are the result of interactions in an
extended network that is not constrained by the deﬁned boundaries.
Thus the requirement to circumscribe the market for the purposes of
operationalizing the model does not preclude its use to describe be-
havior in an open network, as is proposed in this paper.2.2.2. Concepts of stationarity
The Dirichlet assumption of stationarity would appear to be con-
sistent with stable long term relationships. However, stationarity in
aDirichlet context refers to irregular but approximately steady aggregate
measures of purchasing behavior (total sales, market share) which in
turn lead to the assumption that individual buying propensities remain
approximately stable over the short to medium term (Goodhardt et al.,
1984). Market stationarity has been observed to persist into the long
termwithout substantial changes in the size of the category or in the loy-
alty metrics for suppliers in the category (Sharp et al., 2012). Exceptions
arise from temporary variations due to promotional activity or dis-
tribution problems (Ehrenberg, Hammond, & Goodhardt, 1994) or
from permanent structural adjustments through strategic changes
(e.g.withdrawal or entry of a supplier or innovation to create a new cat-
egory) (Graham, 2009). It should be noted that short term in Dirichlet
analyses is typically taken to be one to two quarters, medium term up
to four quarters and long term three to six years. In the markets-
as-networks approach, stability usually refers to the longevity anda) Dyad embedded 
in network 
b) Multiple dy
overlapping n
1 2
Fig. 1. Single network and netwocontinuity of interﬁrm relationships which can persist over several
decades (Dubois et al., 2003).
Low (1997, p. 190) notes that network relationships inmature indus-
tries are often stable, reﬂecting “the many hours spent in experimenting
with various connections and combinations of actors' activities and
resources”. Established relationships are the outcome of adaptation
and institutionalization of activities (Mattsson, 1997) and invest-
ments to overcome the uncertainties that would otherwise be barriers
to exchange. Stability in relationships arises from the experience of
existing and potential partners. In a similar fashion, the steady purchase
propensities of theDirichlet assumptions arise fromexperienced buyers
who are not easily inﬂuenced by short term interactions. This does not
mean that the Dirichlet is based on concepts of exchange that empha-
size one-off transactions with no history and no future (McLoughlin &
Horan, 2002). Experience of previous activities, transaction costs and
perceived risks are subsumed into the model such that the observed ac-
tivity takes into account what has gone before. Buyers are “busy cogni-
tive misers” (Sharp et al., 2012) and supplier choice decisions on a
given purchase occasion are typically made quickly with little informa-
tion processing (Ehrenberg, Uncles, & Goodhardt, 2004; Popkowski
Leszczyc & Bass, 1998). This type of decision-making can be compared
with theway inwhich decisionmakingwithin relationshipsmay be rou-
tinized (Brennan, 2006) or how experienced network actorsmay use in-
tuitive decision strategies over rational decision strategies (Vanharanta&
Easton, 2010).
The stability of long term relationships in industrial markets is
often contrasted with the free-for-all of perfectly competitive markets,
where switching costs are low and customers can freely choose alterna-
tive suppliers for directly substitutable products (Easton, 1992; Ritter,
Wilkinson, & Johnston, 2004). The prevalence of long-lasting relation-
ships would appear to preclude the Dirichlet notion of buyers distribut-
ing purchases “as if random” between several suppliers. However, the
market described by the Dirichlet does not imply that buyers will
share their purchases between all of the potential alternative suppliers
(Sharp et al., 2012). Buyers typically have a repertoire of known sup-
pliers that they purchase from (or maintain relationships with). This
repertoire may be as small as a single supplier (sole loyalty or single
sourcing) and will vary across the population of buyers. The extent of
single sourcing is an important feature of the market structure and
may be relatively low (a repertoiremarket, characteristic of many pack-
aged consumer good markets) or may be high (a subscription market,
characteristic of markets dominated by long term contracts, e.g. utilities)
(Sharp, Wright, & Goodhardt, 2002).
Over the medium to long term, the buyer's portfolio of relation-
ships may change dramatically (Autry & Golicic, 2010; Dubois et al.,
2003; Gadde & Mattsson, 1987; Kamp, 2005). These studies showads embedded in a network of 
etworks  
(n-1) n
rk of overlapping networks.
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with the most frequent changes to the supply base being the addition
or withdrawal of a supplier. Changes to the supply base usually in-
volve growing or shrinking the repertoire rather than a like-for-like
substitution of one supplier for another. As demonstrated in this paper,
stochastic techniques can be used “to study the proportion of newly
established, continuing and disrupted relationships” and “to analyze
the total network with the idea of detecting patterns of structural
change” (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987, p. 32).
The preceding discussion has several important implications for
the interpretation of the Dirichlet patterns in terms of organizational
relationships. Routinized decision making by experienced network ac-
tors is consistent with the underlying Dirichlet assumptions of steady
(habitual) purchase propensities. Intuitive decision strategies which
may be observed directly or indirectly (for example through the
emergence of Dirichlet type patterns) prompt further research into
the mechanisms that give rise to such strategies. The distinction be-
tween repertoire and subscription markets provides a framework for
describingmarket structure and for identifying anomalies. For instance,
an individual buyer that maintains a portfolio of supplier relationships
is exhibiting behavior that is entirely consistent with behavior in a rep-
ertoire market but would be unusual in a subscription market. Changes
in market structure over time can also be analyzed through a series of
Dirichlet “snapshots” over an extended period of time. The changes in
structure emerge from changes in individual interaction behaviors
which can then be the subject of further focused research.
2.2.3. Concepts of non-partitioning (no segmentation)
The Dirichlet concept of lack of partitioning (a non-segmented
market) means that the proportion of a particular buyer's purchases
accounted for by any one supplier is independent of how the buyer
distributes their purchases among the remaining suppliers (subject
to the mathematical constraint that the individual choice probabilities
must sum to one) (Goodhardt et al., 1984). The way that individual
buyers distribute their purchases among their repertoire of suppliers
is individual to each buyer. Themarkets-as-networks approach also rec-
ognizes the heterogeneity of network actors and their interactions al-
though it focuses on individually signiﬁcant relationships rather than
describing how the heterogeneity is distributed across the network
(Ford & Håkansson, 2006; Mattsson & Johanson, 2006).
A lack of segmentation can be interpreted as no special clustering
of particular suppliers within the product category. This may be the
case for directly substitutable products but functional sub-categories
may exist within the category. There are no examples of this in the
fewDirichlet studies that have been conducted in organizationalmarkets
but clustering has been observed in consumer's choice of restaurant
based on the availability of vegetarian food (Sharp & Driesener, 2000),
in a luxury car segment in the automobile market and between leaded
and unleaded fuel (Ehrenberg et al., 2004). This kind of partitioning
can be observed through the duplication of purchases betweenparticular
suppliers, i.e. the proportion of buyers of Supplier A who also purchase
from Supplier B. The important point to note here is that these clusters
emerge from the purchasing behavior of individual buyers and are not
normative segments based on pre-determined attributes of the buying
population.
Clusters that do emerge from individual interactions can be identi-
ﬁed through the Dirichlet analysis, providing opportunities for further
research, in particular into the mechanisms and factors that may give
rise to such clusters.
2.3. Theory development and the Dirichlet
The process of theory development with the Dirichlet stresses the in-
teractions between theory and empirical analysiswhereby observed reg-
ularities lead to the establishment of empirically grounded theory. This
in turn prompts more empirical work to test the theory more widelyunder different conditions to extend its generalizability, to develop it
conceptually and to establish boundary conditions for its applica-
tion. Data and theory are interdependent, combining in a creative
process to produce new understanding and knowledge. In the markets-
as-networks tradition this has been called “systematic combining”
(Dubois & Gadde, 2002); Ehrenberg (1994) calls it “Empirical then
Theoretical” (EtT).
As the population of buyers and suppliers in an organizational
Dirichlet study is likely to be an order of magnitude lower than a typical
consumer panel, there is the opportunity to develop theorywith in-depth
case research into individual relationships. For example, it has been
suggested that network structure emerges from the constraints imposed
by actor interdependence. If there is no interdependence there will be
no structure and the resulting system will be stochastic; the extent of
interdependence determines the extent of structure in the network
(Easton, 1992). The Dirichlet provides a mechanism for elaborating
market structure and differentiates between repertoire markets (high
incidence of split loyalty, few sole buyers, less interdependence) and
subscription markets (low incidence of split loyalty, many sole buyers,
more interdependence). Comparing relationships in markets charac-
terized by high interdependence with those of low interdependence
will provide insights into the nature of interdependence and the
multidimensionality of buyer–seller relationships (Zerbini & Castaldo,
2007). The size of the repertoire (the number of supplier relation-
ships held by an individual buyer) will be determined by the balance
between the beneﬁts and costs of exploitation versus exploration
(Wilkinson & Young, 2002). The Dirichlet analysis permits the com-
parison of individual buyer repertoires and leads to improved under-
standing of the environmental factors upon which repertoire size
may be contingent.
The connectedness of relationships is expected to have construc-
tive effects on network identity, through resource transferability, ac-
tivity complementarity and relationship generalizability (Anderson,
Håkansson, & Johanson, 1994). In the Dirichlet analysis, the extent
of sole buying and the duplication of purchase are potential mea-
sures of connectedness that can be compared between individual
actors in a market or between different market situations. The abil-
ity to make such comparisons assists in the identiﬁcation of cases
with speciﬁc characteristics to direct and inform further research
into individual relationships and the network in which they are
embedded.
Deviations from the Dirichlet model will also provide bases for
further research. By searching for “exceptions or surprises” (Ryan,
Tähtinen, Vanharanta, & Mainela, 2012) boundary conditions can
be established and theory further developed. Deviations may be sys-
temic and characteristic to organizational markets in which case the
Dirichlet model may be extended to accommodate the speciﬁc condi-
tions of business to business exchange. An example of such a deviation
is a tendency to overpredict penetration and underpredict purchase fre-
quency which may be attributed to the concentration of organizational
purchasing into fewer, larger purchasers (Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 1997;
McCabe, Stern, & Dacko, 2012). Other deviations may point to depar-
tures from the basic assumptions of stationarity and lack of partitioning,
allowing the interpretation of dynamic situations, for example the grad-
ual development of a new buyer–seller relationship (Ehrenberg et al.,
2004).
The insights into market structure and organizational buyer behav-
ior afforded by stochastic modeling permit a sequential analysis where-
by the representations from stochastic modeling can direct purposeful
interpretive research. The following empirical examples demonstrate
this process in practice through the analysis of two dynamic collabora-
tive purchasing situations with externalities impacting upon individual
and network behaviors. In addition to a differentiated replication of the
Dirichlet, the evolution of the purchasing patterns during the period of
analysis provides insights into changes inmarket structure and individ-
ual ﬁrm behavior.
Table 2
Purchasing patterns in average six month periods.
Base period Supplier Market
share
(%)
Penetration
(%)
Purchase
frequency
SCR
(%)
(a) Coronary stents
Average 6 months A 50 18 8.4 75
B 16 15 3.2 44
C 13 12 3.2 33
D 13 8 5.2 35
E 8 8 3.0 25
(b) Ureteral stents
Average 6 months X 51 15 4.0 66
Y 44 11 4.3 59
Z 5 4 1.6 64
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We examine two data sets which come from the same source and
therefore have superﬁcial similarities. During the period of analysis
there are managerial interventions to change purchasing behaviors
and thus the data sets provide an opportunity to study changes in
market structure. We conduct analyses of the two markets, and the
extent of their associated stationarity and lack of partitioning, revealing
that superﬁcial similarities mask differences in the network relation-
ships and their evolution. These differences are explained through the
lens of the Dirichlet.
3.1. Background
Purchase order data fromapublic healthcare collaborative purchasing
organization were collected and analyzed. Group purchasing can deliver
savings through consistent pricing, volume aggregation and product
standardization (Bakker, Walker, & Harland, 2006; Chapman, Gupta, &
Mango, 1998; Essig, 2000) and to aid this process, purchasing groups
often collect data from their member organizations in order to monitor
buying activity. The minimum data requirements to operationalize the
Dirichlet are the identities of the buying organization and the supplying
organization and the date of purchase. These data are typically available
from the purchase order andwhen collected from themember organiza-
tions in the purchasing group they are analogous to those available from
scanner data in a consumer marketing context although the number of
buyers will typically be several orders of magnitude smaller than in stud-
ies of consumer buying behavior.
The analysis is carried out on two categories of surgical
consumables— cardiac and ureteral stents. These are structural compo-
nents used to maintain ﬂow through damaged blood vessels or to facil-
itate surgery. Purchase data for three years, from 2006 to 2008, were
collected, with 18 cardiac stent buyers making 402 purchases and 45
ureteral stent buyers making 591 purchases. During the period of anal-
ysis there are two distinct managerial interventions that attempt to
change the buying behavior of the member organizations in the pur-
chasing group. In the cardiac stent category the purchasing group intro-
duced a set of framework agreements which were negotiated with all
suppliers andwere intended to deliver consistent pricing across the col-
laborative procurement organization with volume discounts agreed
based on the existing portfolio of suppliers so that there was no im-
posed restriction on clinician choice. In the ureteral stent category the
intervention took the form of increased sales and promotional activity
by one supplier.
In both categories the observed purchasing data is used to
operationalize the Dirichlet model. The model predictions are compared
with the observed behaviors in order to assess the extent to which the
Dirichlet holds for these data sets, representing differentiated replica-
tions in a collaborative purchasing environment characterized by sub-
stantial changes in buyer behavior over an extended period of time.
The purchasing patterns are then analyzed to investigate where the sto-
chastic modeling approach can direct further research to uncover the
mechanisms that generate large scale regularities in buyer behavior,
in particular in the emergent market structure, market making as
evidenced by the changes in buyer behavior and the interpretation
of deviations from the Dirichlet theoretical predictions.
3.2. Regular patterns of buyer behavior
Table 2 shows how the aggregated purchasing behaviors show
consistent patterns in both categories. The performance metrics of
penetration (the proportion of the buying population who purchase
at least once from a particular supplier during the period), purchase
frequency (the average number of purchases of a particular supplier
made by purchasers of that supplier) and share of category require-
ments (SCR) (the proportion of a buyer's total purchases of a categorythat are fulﬁlled by the particular supplier) are used to compare the
purchasing behaviors between periods and between observed values
and theoretical predictions. The patterns seen in Table 2 are consis-
tent with the patterns typically seen in Dirichlet markets.
While themarket shares and penetrations decrease greatly from large
to small suppliers, purchase frequency and share of category (SCR) re-
quirements generally varymuch less. A typical sub-pattern is that buyers
of low share suppliers also tend to purchase slightly less frequently, the
so-called “Double Jeopardy” effect (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000) — with
the reverse observed for buyers from high share suppliers. This pattern
can be seen clearly in the ureteral stent case but two exceptions are no-
ticeable in the coronary stent category. Supplier A has a purchase fre-
quency that is high compared to the other suppliers in the category.
This arises from one high frequency buyer being solely loyal to Supplier
A throughout the period of analysis. Supplier D also has a higher purchase
frequency than the other suppliers, a deviation from the expected pattern
arising fromone buyermaking a large number of purchases in the last six
months of the analysis period. The share of category requirements, which
measures the extent to which buyers fulﬁll their category requirements
from the particular supplier, indicates that in both categories buyers
tend to split their purchases between several suppliers. In the coronary
stent category, Supplier A is the only supplier that accounts for over
half of its buyers' category requirements. Supplier E only fulﬁlls about a
quarter of its customers' category requirements meaning that their cus-
tomers buy from other suppliers three times more than they buy from
Supplier E. In the ureteral stent category all suppliers fulﬁll about 60% of
their buyers' requirements.
3.3. Theoretical predictions
Tables 3 and 5 present the observed performance and the theoret-
ical Dirichlet predictions for the coronary stent and ureteral stent cat-
egories respectively, details of the practical steps in ﬁtting the model
may be found in the Appendix A. While Table 2 shows the average ob-
served behaviors over the entire three year period, Tables 3 and 5
show the changes in the observed behaviors as a series of “snapshots”
taken in each of the three years of the analysis period. This means that
the evolution of themarket structure from year to year can be observed.
In the coronary stent case (Table 3) the purchasing behaviors are
averaged over a twenty-four week period from each of the three years
between 2006 and 2008. Two twenty-four week periods are included
for 2008, representing the period before and after the implementation
of the negotiated framework agreements. The table shows how the pur-
chasing behaviors develop, in particular after the implementation of the
framework agreements. Initially (2006 to 2007) the average supplier
penetration falls from 18% to 10% as the number of purchasers de-
creases. The purchase frequency stays approximately constant until
the last half of 2008. This constant purchase frequency is a feature of
Dirichlet type markets and reﬂects the underlying assumption that
buyers have a steady long term mean purchasing rate. However, there
Table 3
Coronary stent observed and theoretical performance measures.
Year Supplier Market share
(%)
Penetration
(%)
Purchase
frequency
SCR
(%)
Sole buyers
(%)
Sole buyer
purchase
frequency
O T O T O T O T O T
2006 A 44 25 32 8.0 6.2 78 46 20 18 1.0 1.6
B 13 15 19 4.0 3.2 33 18 0 7 0.0 1.2
C 9 10 14 4.0 2.8 24 14 0 6 0.0 1.1
D 17 15 21 5.0 3.5 26 20 33 8 6.0 1.2
E 17 25 21 3.0 3.5 19 20 0 8 0.0 1.2
Average supplier 18 21 4.8 3.8 36 24 11 9 3.5 1.3
r 0.79 0.91 0.95 0.42 −0.01
Mean Absolute Deviation 5 1.2 13 10 1.8
2007 A 57 15 25 9.3 5.6 78 60 33 33 19.0 2.5
B 17 15 13 2.7 3.2 73 25 33 13 1.0 1.4
C 12 10 10 3.0 4.5 50 22 0 12 0.0 1.3
D 6 5 6 3.0 2.6 27 18 0 10 0.0 1.3
E 8 5 7 4.0 2.7 50 19 0 10 0.0 1.3
Average supplier 10 12 4.4 3.7 56 29 13 15 10.0 1.5
r 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.69 1.00
Mean Absolute Deviation 3 1.5 27 11 4.2
2008 months 1–6 A 60 10 21 13.0 6.0 81 62 50 32 21.0 2.1
B 7 5 6 3.0 2.4 50 15 0 8 0.0 1.1
C 12 15 9 1.7 2.7 26 18 33 9 2.0 1.2
D 16 10 12 3.5 3.0 50 22 50 11 3.0 1.2
E 5 5 5 2.0 2.2 33 13 0 7 0.0 1.2
Average supplier 9 11 4.6 3.3 48 26 27 13 8.7 1.4
r 0.41 0.98 0.88 0.62 0.99
Mean Absolute Deviation 4 1.9 22 19 4.8
2008 months 7–12 A 44 15 23 11.7 7.5 66 55 67 37 10.5 5.3
B 9 10 6 3.5 5.4 30 33 0 20 0.0 3.3
C 21 15 14 5.7 6.1 71 40 33 25 1.0 3.9
D 23 5 14 18.0 6.2 56 40 0 25 0.0 4.0
E 3 5 2 2.0 5.0 100 29 100 18 2.0 3.0
Average supplier 10 12 8.2 6.0 65 39 40 25 4.5 3.9
r 0.63 0.63 −0.11 0.06 0.82
Mean Absolute Deviation 5 4.3 26 33 3.3
O: Observed.
T: Dirichlet theoretical predictions.
Table 4
Goodness of ﬁt for penetration in heavy and light purchasing segments.
Year Correlation between
observed and theoretical
distributions
(r)
Mean Absolute Deviation
between observed and
theoretical distributions
(%)
All buyers Heavy Light All buyers Heavy Light
2006 0.79 −0.61 0.8 5.0 3.1 3.0
2007 0.80 0.94 0.99 3.1 1.5 0.9
2008 months 1 to 6 0.41 0.60 0.97 4.1 2.3 0.4
2008 months 7 to 12 0.63 0.93 0.95 5.1 2.1 1.4
427J. McCabe et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 42 (2013) 421–432is an increase in purchase frequency after the introduction of the
purchasing framework agreements (2008, months 7–12). This may
indicate purchase deferment in advance of the implementation of
the frameworks and a subsequent restocking at more advantageous
prices after the implementation. If this was the case, after some time
the purchase frequency would be expected to revert to the long run
rates (Ehrenberg et al., 1994; Macé & Neslin, 2004).
It is also interesting to consider how the observed loyalty changes
after the introduction of the framework agreements. Initially Supplier
A satisﬁes about 80% of its buyers' requirements, a higher loyalty than
that enjoyed by the other suppliers. However, this observed loyalty
level drops to 66% after the implementation of the framework agree-
ments, suggesting that buyers are now more prepared (or able) to split
their purchases between different suppliers. The framework agreements
may have enhanced the credibility and hence the perceived availability
of alternative suppliers.
The Dirichlet predictions show a much poorer ﬁt than that typically
seen in consumer markets. Table 3 presents the most commonly used
measures of ﬁt, the correlation coefﬁcient, r, and theMean Absolute De-
viation (MAD). The test is one of sameness; that the relationship be-
tween observed and expected measures should have similar levels of
scatter to previous studies andwithout any systematic bias. In consum-
er studies these limits are usually interpreted as a MAD typically about
10% of the mean of the particular performance measure and a correla-
tion coefﬁcient, r, of 0.9 (Ehrenberg, 1994; Uncles et al., 1995).
The relatively poor ﬁt (a deviation) provides a focus for further
analysis which looks in more detail at the frequency of purchase. Sep-
arating out the top three purchasers gives a much improved ﬁt as
seen in Table 4.A visual comparison of the deviations between the observed and
expected behaviors shows a systematic tendency for the model to
overestimate the number of buyers and to underestimate the purchase
frequency of those buyers, which may be a characteristic of markets
with a concentration of purchases in fewer, larger buyers (Bowman &
Lele-Pingle, 1997), a description that corresponds to many organiza-
tional markets. There are also notable deviations between the observed
and predicted loyalty values (Share of Category Requirements and sole
loyalty) for all suppliers. The typical repertoire market Dirichlet pat-
terns of sole loyalty are seen in 2006 with a relatively low proportion
of sole buyers, and with the sole buyers purchasing at a relatively low
frequency. This pattern is disrupted in 2007 and in the subsequent
years by the evolution of one solely loyal, high frequency purchaser
from Supplier A, leading to marked deviations between the observed
loyalty and the Dirichlet predictions. It should also be noted that devia-
tions such as those seen for Supplier E in 2008 months 7–12 can arise
428 J. McCabe et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 42 (2013) 421–432from the lack of opportunity that buyers of smaller (i.e. infrequently
purchased) suppliers have to choose alternative suppliers.
Table 5 presents the ureteral stent market. The purchasing behav-
iors are averaged over a twelve week period from each of the three
years and the table clearly shows how the market share of Supplier X
decreases over the analysis period while that of Supplier Y increases.
Unlike the coronary stent case, the ureteral stent category was not sub-
ject to any managerial intervention from the collaborative purchasing
organization. However, the observed change in purchasing patterns co-
incides with an increase in promotional activity by Supplier Y and it
may be considered that at least in part, the observed behavioral changes
arise from a supply-side intervention. The individual measures of
penetration, purchase frequency and SCR provide an indication of
the changes in purchasing behaviors that lie behind the changes in
market shares.
Supplier X loses market share because it loses buyers, not because
its existing buyers buy less. Over the three years X's penetration falls
from 18% to 8% while that of Y increases from 13% to 20%. The buyers
of Supplier Y also increase their purchase frequency, perhaps because
the new buyers of Y tend to be heavier purchasers. The increase in the
number of buyers of Y and the increase in their rate of buying results in
the observed change in market share. Buyers of X purchase at roughly
the same frequency through the three years although there is an in-
crease in 2008 as X's buyers are concentrated into a smaller number
of heavier purchasers.
Over the three years of the analysis the observed loyalty levels de-
cline as the heavy (and initially extremely loyal) purchasers of X add
Y to their purchasing repertoires. In 2006, buyers of X and Y fulﬁlled
almost all of their category requirements with their respective suppliers
but by 2008 theyweremuchmore likely to split their purchases between
the two suppliers. In contrast to the coronary stent example, in 2006 the
proportion of ureteral stent buyers who are solely loyal shows more of
the characteristics of a subscription market with relatively high levels
of sole loyalty. By 2008 the market begins to look more like a repertoire
marketwith lower levels of sole loyalty and the purchasing rates of solely
loyal buyers lower than the average for the whole population of buyers.
It should also be noted that the loyalty for Supplier Z is unusually high
because the buyers of this supplier purchase relatively infrequently, giv-
ing few opportunities to satisfy requirements from alternative suppliers.
As with the coronary stents, the comparison between observed
and theoretical measures presented in Table 5 shows that the ﬁt is
poorer than is typically seen in consumer studies with a systematic
tendency to overestimate penetration and to underestimate purchaseTable 5
Ureteral stents observed and theoretical performance measures.
Year Supplier Market share
(%)
Penetration
(%)
P
f
O T O
2006 X 67 18 26 2
Y 26 13 13 1
Z 7 5 4 1
Average supplier 12 14 1
r 0.98 1
Mean Absolute Deviation 3 0
2007 X 47 30 31 2
Y 48 15 31 4
Z 5 8 5 1
Average supplier 18 22 2
r 0.74 0
Mean Absolute Deviation 6 1
2008 X 38 8 15 4
Y 59 20 20 2
Z 3 3 2 1
Average supplier 10 12 2
r 0.87 0
Mean Absolute Deviation 3 0frequency and loyalty consistent with the effect of a small number of
high frequency purchasers. Like the coronary stent market, the ﬁt is
improved when the heavy (high frequency) purchasers are analyzed
as a separate segment (Table 6).
4. Discussion
The preceding empirical analysis demonstrates that themacro-level
behavioral patterns typical of markets modeled by the Dirichlet can be
observed in both categories of stent. The theory also provides bench-
mark norms against which to interpret changes in both supply and
demand and the analysis suggests three areas where the stochastic
modeling approach can fruitfully direct further research to uncover the
mechanisms that generate such regular behaviors, namely, (1) market
structure, including concepts of interdependence and connectedness;
(2) market making under the inﬂuence of supply-side or demand-side
interventions; and (3) the interpretation of deviations from the theoret-
ical predictions. The following sections discuss each of these areas in
turn.
4.1. The Dirichlet representations of market structure provide insights into
interdependence and connectedness in the market under analysis
The two examples demonstrate how theDirichlet representsmarket
structure. In 2006 the coronary stent market has the characteristics of a
repertoire market with low levels of sole loyalty and purchasers willing
and able to split their purchases between suppliers. This implies low
levels of interdependence (Easton, 1992) and may be characteristic of
experienced buyers (physicians) maintaining relationships with a mul-
tiplicity of suppliers. The SCR for Supplier A is higher than the Dirichlet
norm, a previously noted deviation that is usually attributed to avail-
ability, arising from distribution differences between larger and smaller
suppliers (Fader & Schmittlein, 1993). By the end of 2008 the market
appears to be more structured with higher average levels of sole loyalty
and a higher average SCR. This suggests increased interdependence
which may be a consequence of the concentration of buyers into fewer,
larger purchasing centers. However, the SCR for Supplier A is now closer
to the Dirichlet norm suggesting that the introduction of the framework
agreements hasmitigated someof the availability effects. Inclusion in the
set of framework agreements gives alternative suppliers credibility and
changes the balance of beneﬁts and costs in the exploitation versus ex-
ploration consideration (Wilkinson & Young, 2002). In effect the collab-
orative procurement organization has taken on some of the burden ofurchase
requency
SCR
(%)
Sole buyers
(%)
Sole buyer
purchase
frequency
T O T O T O T
.9 1.9 95 76 86 66 3.2 1.7
.6 1.5 89 51 80 41 1.8 1.3
.0 1.3 100 40 100 32 1.0 1.2
.8 1.6 95 56 89 46 2.0 1.4
.00 −0.22 0.47 0.98
.5 39 42 0.7
.3 2.3 69 58 83 39 1.6 1.7
.8 2.3 69 58 50 41 3.0 1.8
.0 1.5 43 30 67 19 1.0 1.2
.7 2.0 60 49 67 33 1.9 1.6
.76 1.00 −0.10 0.83
.0 12 34 0.5
.0 1.9 60 47 33 31 1.0 1.3
.4 2.4 63 65 75 45 1.0 1.2
.0 1.2 100 20 100 15 1.0 1.0
.5 1.8 74 44 69 30 1.0 1.2
.55 −0.88 −0.40
.8 32 39 0.2
Table 6
Goodness of ﬁt for penetration in heavy and light purchasing segments.
Year Correlation between observed
and theoretical distributions
(r)
Mean Absolute Deviation between
observed and theoretical
distributions
(%)
All buyers Heavy Light All buyers Heavy Light
2006 0.98 0.98 0.96 3.3 0.5 1.2
2007 0.74 0.99 0.94 6.4 0.4 3.1
2008 0.87 0.97 * 2.8 0.7 *
* Not possible to ﬁt data for light segment in 2008 (all buyers make one purchase each).
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collaborative purchasing organization can be considered as a form
of institutional connectedness that has a positive effect on the network
identity of the supplier organizations (particularly smaller suppliers)
(Anderson et al., 1994).
The ureteral stent example has a well-deﬁned structure in 2006.
There are twomajor suppliers with the high levels of source loyalty typ-
ical of a subscriptionmarket. This implies high levels of interdependence
but by 2008, buyers appear to be much more willing to share their pur-
chases between suppliers and the previously dominant supplier had lost
almost half of its market share.
In both cases there are observed changes in market structure that
indicate changes in the interdependence and connectedness of net-
work actors that may not have been apparent from an isolated focal
ﬁrm analysis. The representation of market structure provides a con-
text to direct further research into the interactions that generate the
observed structure. This includes the role of the collaborative pur-
chasing organization in developing connectedness and changes in
individual decision making processes that result in the market be-
coming more structured (more interdependent) during the period
of analysis.
4.2. Observing the process ofmarketmaking through changes in the patterns
of network interactions
Two distinct approaches to market making are captured in the two
examples presented. In the ﬁrst instance, the coronary stent example
shows how a collaborative procurement organization can create the
conditions for exchange through the imposition of formal institutions
(the framework agreements) on the existing social structures (Araujo,
2007). These agreements give credibility to potential partners, assisting
the establishment of trust and overcoming some of the uncertainties
that prevent exchange (knowledge of reciprocal wants, agreement on
prices, conﬁdence in speciﬁcations, conﬁdence in mechanisms in case
of default) (Araujo, 2007). The commercial decision to focus on collab-
orative purchasing of coronary stents was inﬂuenced by a perception
that the market was fairly stagnant with comfortable relationships be-
tween suppliers and physicians. However, the Dirichlet analysis shows
an activemarket where buyers distributed their purchases quite widely
among the available suppliers. After the implementation of the frame-
works the market appears to become more structured. In the ureteral
stent example the market making is taken on by a supplier, gradually
building a network position throughmore active interaction, establishing
trust and developing new buyer–supplier relationships alongside the in-
cumbent supplier. This is consistent with observations from previous
studies demonstrating that change in the supply base occurs most often
through gradual addition or withdrawal of suppliers (Dubois et al.,
2003; Gadde & Mattsson, 1987). The Dirichlet patterns act as a lens
through which to interpret the patterns and the behaviors of indi-
vidual actors in each case, in particular the market makers and the
response of purchasing entities to the market making activity. For ex-
ample, a single buyer of coronary stents remains resolutely loyal toSupplier A even after the implementation of the framework agree-
ments. Taken on its own, this is another example of a long-lasting
buyer–seller relationship. However, when set against the background
of a market structure where the norm is split loyalty purchasing, this
solely loyal behavior becomes worthy of closer investigation to under-
stand why exogenous changes affect some relationships differently to
others.
The second example of ureteral stents shows how market making
activities instigated by a supplier affect the network structure moving
froma subscription-typemarket to onewhich ismore typical of Dirichlet
split loyalty.
4.3. Deviations from the Dirichlet benchmarks highlight opportunities for
further research
Deviations from the Dirichlet norms are also potential areas for
theory development. The over-prediction of penetration and the con-
sequent under-prediction of purchase frequency are observed in both
the coronary and ureteral stent markets. This phenomenon has been
attributed to the particular nature of organizational markets, in par-
ticular a tendency to have a smaller number of larger, heavier pur-
chasers (Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 1997). More research is required to
determine whether this deviation can be replicated in other organiza-
tionalmarkets, and if so, whether theDirichletmodel could bemodiﬁed
to accommodate the particular conditions of organizational markets.
Further research should focus on the underlying Dirichlet assump-
tions, in particular the assumption that the purchases of individual
buyers are distributed Poisson (see Section 2.1). A concentration of
heavy buyers means that the overall purchase frequency is higher
than that predicted by a Poisson distribution. In addition, the nature
of interorganizational relationships may mean that successive pur-
chases are inﬂuenced by previous purchase history (particularly dur-
ing a period of transition to a new relationship), violating the zero
order assumption of the Poisson process. The assumption that indi-
vidual purchase propensities are distributed across the population
according to a Gamma distribution will be violated if there is an extra
concentration of heavy buyers. Both of the empirical examples show
how the ﬁt of the model is improved by applying it separately to heavy
and light buyers rather than the whole population.
These insights into market structure, market making and devia-
tions from the theoretical norms help to focus future research ques-
tions towards developing integrated theory through in-depth case
research. For example, comparing the two examples permits deeper
understanding of how subscription and repertoire structures (more
and less interdependence) emerge andwhat inﬂuences this emergence.
The role of the collaborative purchasing organization in market making
can be explored through the perceptions of the network actors, in partic-
ular considering the impact on the power relationships between sellers
and an aggregated buying organization. The analysis does not consider
the wider relationships between the selling and buying organizations,
for example in other product categories. It is possible that stents repre-
sent a very small proportion of the business between a particular suppli-
er and the buyer and that there is a “multiplexity” in the nature of the
relationships depending on the product category (Zerbini & Castaldo,
2007). The extent to which network actors are aware of their net-
work position is also of interest. A share of category requirements
of 33% implies that a buyer is fulﬁlling two thirds of its category
requirements from other suppliers. This may be well understood
or it may come as a surprise to the supply organization. The way
in which network actors perceive this is likely to inﬂuence the way
they perceive their position in the network (Welch & Wilkinson, 2002).
The stochastic modeling approach helps to focus attention on the emer-
gence of new relationships, disrupted relationships and those relation-
ships that are unchanged (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987) and instances
where observed behaviors do not follow the same patterns as those in
the overall network.
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The paper contributes to industrialmarketingmanagement research
ﬁrstly via a differentiated replication of the Dirichlet in a collaborative
purchasing environment, characterized by substantial changes in mar-
ket share and purchasing frequency over an extended period (Uncles
& Kwok, in press). The resulting empirical analyses show how the phe-
nomena observed through stochastic modeling techniques represent
fruitful areas for the development of explanatory theory. The second
contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence to demon-
strate how regular patterns of behavior typical of Dirichlet markets
are generated in industrial networks and how such patterns inform
our understanding of interactions in network relationships. In particu-
lar, the analysis of the large scale regularities that emerge from interac-
tions within a “network of overlapping networks” of multiple buyers
and sellers in two product categories provides an overview of market
structure that is not possible from a focal ﬁrm perspective. The applica-
tion of the stochastic modeling approach over an extended period also
permits changes in the relationship portfolio to be monitored and ana-
lyzed. Understanding how changes are manifest in observable pur-
chasing behavior allows the underlying mechanisms that result in
the formation of new relationships, the disruption of existing relation-
ships and the stability of other relationships to be studied. Stochastic
modeling and industrial marketing share important assumptions about
the individuality of network participants and the constraints on indepen-
dent actions imposed by network interdependence or the steady pur-
chasing behaviors of experienced buyers (McCabe & Stern, 2009) and
this paper extends the argument that both research perspectives can
and should be used together to identify and explain organizational mar-
keting and purchasing behavior.
In our third contributionwedemonstrate how thedeviations between
the observed purchase behaviors and the theoretical predictions for the
network provide another source of phenomena for further investigation
and explanation, improving our understanding of network relationships.
In order to develop more general theories of industrial marketing,
the onus is on researchers to focus empirical analysis and theory devel-
opment in areas that build and extend the generalizability of existing
theories or explain generalizable phenomena. This paper provides an
empirical basis for the sequential application of stochastic modeling
and in-depth analysis to make progress in the development of more
integrated theory. The Dirichlet acts as an integrating framework to
identify large scale regularities of interest that repeat across different in-
dustries, ﬁrms and relationships. Uncovering and explaining the associat-
ed structures andmechanisms that bring about the observed phenomena
support the development of theories that apply across a wide range of
contexts. This sequential application is entirely consistentwith the realist
ontology of much industrial marketing research (Mingers, 2003).
In addition to these direct implications for researchers in industrial
markets and stochastic modelers, the adoption of modeling techniques
has important implications for simulation of business networks. Agent-
based computer simulationsmay use the regular patterns of theDirichlet
and the theoretical ideas about the generative mechanisms that
bring about these patterns to simulate network behaviors (Welch
& Wilkinson, 2002). Such virtual networks have the potential to
be valuable tools for experimental research and teaching.
There are also important implications for management. The em-
pirical analysis has shown how managerial intervention can disrupt
established relationships and change long run purchasing behaviors.
The understanding of how such interventions can work and of the na-
ture of successful and unsuccessful interventions can provide normative
guidance for managers seeking to bring about change in networks. In-
terventions must be sympathetic to the relationship conditions (Ritter
et al., 2004) and must go with the grain of existing purchase behavior.
A key lesson of “Dirichlet” markets with steady long run purchase
rates is that gaining market share in a speciﬁc product category will
generally mean following Willie Sutton's dictum and “ﬁnding newbanks” i.e. acquiring more customers rather than persuading existing
customers to buy more.
The combination of stochastic modeling and industrial marketing
research presents an iterative process of theory development and em-
pirical analysis that will inform our understanding of relationships in
industrial networks. In turn, stochastic modeling gains from a deep
and rich analysis to develop theoretical insights into the generative
mechanisms underlying observed patterns and regularities. As Epstein
(2008, p. 12) observes, “models can surprise us, make us curious, and
lead to new questions”. Purposeful empiricism takes these new ques-
tions and uses them to move the research agenda beyond structure
and isolated studies towards a more integrated understanding and ex-
planation of behavior in organizational markets.
Appendix A. Fitting the model
The approach described below is the one used in this research and
also used in other operationalizations of the Dirichlet. The data required
to ﬁt the model for a chosen product category in a speciﬁc time period
are as follows:
(i) The proportion of the population buying the category at all (B)
(ii) The average number of purchase occasions recorded for those
in the population who purchase the category at all (W)
(iii) For each supplier, the proportion of the population buying
from that supplier at all (bi)
(iv) For each supplier, the average number of purchase occasions
recorded for those in the population who purchase from that
supplier at all (wi).
Each of the leading suppliers is used to generate the model param-
eters in turn. The individual supplier parameters are then combined
as a weighted average based upon market share.
The two structural parameters of the Dirichlet distribution, K and
S, are characteristic of the product category and reﬂect the heteroge-
neity of the buying population. K can be considered as a measure of
purchase rate diversity and S has been described as a switching pa-
rameter. A low value of S (b0.2) implies low levels of switching and
a high proportion of sole loyalty; higher values of S imply more split
loyalty purchase behavior (Li, Habel, & Rungie, 2009).
Themethod of ﬁtting themodel follows the procedures in Goodhardt
et al. (1984) and Ehrenberg (1988). The parameter K is determined from
the observed proportion of non-buyers of the category and can be deter-
mined from the sample, equated to the expected value from theNegative
Binomial Distribution and the resulting equation solved for K. This equa-
tion cannot be solved directly and requires an iterative solution. The
estimation of the S parameter is also by an iterative procedure, using
non-buyers of the particular supplier to ﬁt the model in the same way
as for the NBD. This is repeated for the other suppliers and the overall
Dirichlet parameter is calculated from aweighted average of the supplier
S using the market shares of each supplier. The mathematics is complex
but computer programs have been developed to calculate the Dirichlet
parameters and the one used in this research was BUYER (Uncles,
1989). Another available program is DIRICHLET (Kearns, 2009) which
provides details on data processing procedures.
Using the model
Having ﬁtted the NBD-Dirichlet model, it is used to predict a range
of metrics (Ehrenberg et al., 2004) for the time period of analysis and
for time periods of different lengths. These metric predictions can
then be compared to the observed measures.
Typical predicted measures include:
(i) Penetration of purchasers, i.e. the proportion of the population
buying from that supplier
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that supplier)
(iii) Share of category requirements, i.e. the share of requirements
that buyers of a particular supplier actually meet from that
supplier
(iv) Percentage of sole buyers, i.e. buyers whomeet all their catego-
ry requirements with a single supplier
(v) Rate of purchase of sole buyers
(vi) Duplication of purchase, i.e. what other suppliers are used by
buyers of a particular supplier.
All of these measures are determined using the same software
used to calculate the Dirichlet parameters. The calculations for each
of the measures are described in Ehrenberg (1988).
Testing the model
Having derived the set of supplier performancemeasures, it is nec-
essary to test whether the model holds i.e. the predicted values are in-
deed a good ﬁt to the observed values.
The purpose of the goodness of ﬁt test is not just to compare the
distribution of measures from the data with the distribution predicted
by the model to accept or reject the hypothesis, i.e. that the observed
data can be described by the NBD-Dirichlet model. Just because a ﬁt
has been obtained at some conﬁdence level does not mean that the
model is correct (Schunn & Wallach, 2001). There are other models,
other data sets that could lead to equally good ﬁts. As Ehrenberg
(1988, p.23) notes, “the important point is not so much whether the
discrepancies are real (or merely sampling errors) but that the same
theoretical formula accounts for the greater part of the observed varia-
tion and that the residual deviations are relatively small and more or
less unbiased”.
The most commonly used measures are the Mean Absolute Devia-
tion and the correlation coefﬁcient. A good (enough) ﬁt is considered
when the Mean Absolute Deviation is less than 10% of the mean of the
particular performance measure and the correlation coefﬁcient, r is
greater than 0.9 (Ehrenberg, 1994; Uncles et al., 1995).
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